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WRITING IT RIGHT

Sports in the Courts:

How Sports References Strengthen Written
Advocacy and Judicial Opinions (Part I)
By Douglas E. Abrams
Early in the morning of July 23,
2000, four police officers responded
to a call about a melee at a home in
Brigham City, Utah. Through a screen
door and windows, the arriving officers witnessed a violent fight and a
victim spitting blood into the kitchen
sink. The officers opened the door,
announced their presence, entered the
kitchen, quelled the altercation, and
made arrests.
In 2006, in Brigham City v. Stuart,
the Supreme Court unanimously held
that the Fourth Amendment permitted
the officers to enter the home without
a warrant because they had an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that an occupant was seriously injured,
or imminently threatened with serious
injury.1 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. reinforced
the holding with a sports analogy:
“The role of a peace officer includes
preventing violence and restoring
order, not simply rendering first aid
to casualties; an officer is not like a
boxing (or hockey) referee, poised to
stop a bout only if it becomes too onesided.”2
Brigham City’s analogy was unprompted because no reference to
sports appeared anywhere in the briefs
of either party or any amicus.
Chief Justice Roberts – the captain of his high school football team
years earlier and thus conversant in
athletics3 – employed a rhetorical
technique increasingly used by the
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Justices and lower federal and state
judges since the early 1970s. In cases
with no claims or defenses concerning sports, written opinions frequently
help explain substantive or procedural
points with references to the rules or
terminology of sports familiar to many
Americans.
This two-part article explores the
growth of this familiar rhetorical technique in the courts. Part I here discusses the proliferation of sports references
in Supreme Court opinions, and begins
discussing that proliferation in the
lower federal and state courts. In the
next issue of Precedent, Part II finishes
discussing sports references in lower
courts, and concludes by describing
how these references invigorate formal
writing by advocates and judges.
Writers crafting an argument
express themselves best when they
“front load,” that is, when they orient
readers by stating the conclusion at the
outset, before proceeding to analysis
and resolution. My conclusion here,
which I will articulate more fully in
Part II, is that careful use of sports
references normally strengthens written advocacy and judicial opinions by
enhancing the reader’s understanding,
but that the particularly high stakes at
issue in some cases may make a sports
reference seem inconsistent with the
dignity and prestige that sustain the
judicial role.
Such “high-stakes” cases incompatible with sports references are few.
The example set by the Supreme Court
itself, where high-stakes cases are the
norm, should continue to encourage
Precedent Spring 2010

careful use of sports references.
The word “sports” may conjure
images of fun-and-games, assertedly
incompatible with courtroom formality in the administration of justice.
Careful use of sports references in
written advocacy and judicial opinions, however, recognizes that amateur and professional sports is “one
of the most powerful social forces in
our country,”4 indeed “a microcosm
of American society”5 with “special
significance in our culture,”6 and thus
with a special capacity to forge a bond
of understanding between writer and
reader. Advocates write for an audience distinct from the audience that
judges seek to reach, but the bond
remains constant for advocates and
judges alike.
“Legal briefs are necessarily filled
with abstract concepts that are difficult
to explain,” advises Justice Antonin
Scalia. “Nothing clarifies their meaning as well as examples” because examples “cause the serious legal points
you’re making to be more vivid, more
lively, and hence more memorable.”7
For advocates and judges alike, examples drawn from sports are favorites
because they are particularly effective
vehicles to (as Justice Scalia advises)
“Make it interesting.”8

SPORTS REFERENCES IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Before the early 1970s, sports
references in Supreme Court and
lower federal and state court opinions
were not unknown, but remained
quite rare. A court might discuss
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legal “ground rules,” might liken
intricate argumentation or analysis
to the contortions characteristic
of “gymnastics,” or might declare
specified conduct or arguments “out
of bounds.”9 Few decisions, however,
ventured beyond these core sports
terms that were already ingrained in
the American lexicon.10
The flowering of sports references
in federal and state judicial opinions
began in earnest shortly after the
Supreme Court handed down Flood
v. Kuhn in 1972.11 When the St. Louis
Cardinals traded Curt Flood to the
Philadelphia Phillies after the 1969
season without his consent, he wrote
to Baseball Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn, objecting that he was not “a
piece of property to be bought and
sold irrespective of my wishes.”12
When the letter fell on deaf ears, the
three-time all-star and seven-time
Gold Glove winner filed an antitrust
suit challenging the reserve clause
in Major League baseball’s standard
contract. The reserve system bound
a player to his first club for his entire
career unless the team traded him –
that is, assigned his contract – and
bound the player permanently to the
new club until a future unilateral
trade.
Flood acknowledged that
professional baseball is a business
engaged in interstate commerce, but
held that Major League baseball’s
reserve system enjoyed an exemption
from the federal antitrust laws unless
Congress overruled prior Supreme
Court decisions that had conferred
the exemption. Justice Harry A.
Blackmun’s majority opinion opened
with a reverential history of the
“colorful days” of baseball, climaxed
by a list of 88 fomer Major League
stars who “have sparked the diamond
and its environs and . . . provided

tinder for recaptured thrills, for
reminiscence and comparisons, and
for conversation and anticipation inseason and off-season.”13 Before the
Court presented the facts and turned
to legal analysis, the page-long list
closed with this solemn disclaimer:
“These are names only from earlier
years. By mentioning some, one risks
unintended omission of others equally
celebrated.”14
Justice Blackmun’s odyssey into
baseball lore was an unabashed
fan’s pure dictum in a high-visibility
decision awaited not only by baseball
fans, but also by fans of other sports
that enjoyed no judicially-conferred
antitrust exemption. Flood’s
visibility grew when arbitrator Peter
Seitz struck down baseball’s reserve
system in the case of pitchers Andy
Messersmith and Dave McNally
in 1975, four years before the Bob
Woodward-Scott Armstrong bestseller, The Brethren, provided an
intimate account of the justices’
deliberations leading to what the
two authors called Flood’s “ode to
baseball.”15
So prominent an ode in so
prominent a decision by the nation’s
highest court helped signal an
expanded role for sports references
in official judicial writing, not only
in cases that (such as Flood itself)
raised claims directly related to
sports, but also in other cases (such
as Brigham City v. Stuart) in which
a sports reference might help a court
explain salient points of law or
fact. Lower court judges typically
examine Supreme Court opinions in
the advance sheets, and Flood lent
an aura of respectability to sports
references that the justices themselves
and the lower courts have embraced
in their official writing ever since.16
Flood reached the United
Precedent Spring 2010

States Reports at a particularly
opportune moment for cultivating
this respectability. Since the early
1970s, judges have had greater
reason than ever before to presume
their readers’ familiarity with a wide
range of sports and their respective
vocabularies. Today’s judges, lawyers
and litigants grew into adulthood
amid an unprecedented saturation
of professional and amateur sports
in broadcasting, the print media,
and more recently on the Internet.
Newspapers, conventional radio,
and network television now coexist
with, and frequently face eclipse
by, all-sports radio stations, cable
and satellite television channels,
interactive blogs, and other outlets
that provide instantaneous aroundthe-clock access to sports, teams
and star players. “[T]hrough their
pervasive presence in the media,”
says the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, “sports . . . celebrities
have come to symbolize certain ideas
and values in our society and have
become valuable means of expression
in our culture.”17
In 1976, just four years after Flood,
writer James A. Michener correctly
observed that “[s]ports have become
a major force in American life.”18 For
most Americans, immersion in (as the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit put it) the nation’s “sportsdominated culture” begins at a tender
age.19 Almost half the nation’s
children – approximately 30 to 35
million – participate each year in at
least one public or private organized
sports program.20 Nearly all children
have first-hand experience playing
organized sports before they turn
18, and no other activity outside the
home or school reaches so many boys
and girls from coast to coast.21
Play continues beyond childhood
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and adolescence with so-called
“carryover,” or “lifetime,” sports
conducive to active participation
throughout adulthood.22 With
influential public and private voices
advocating the demonstrated health
benefits of vigorous lifelong physical
activity, sports today attracts not
only adult spectators drawn to mass
public entertainment, but also adult
participants drawn to gymnasiums
and playing fields nationwide.23
Sports references ingrained in our
national culture find a comfortable
place in written advocacy and
opinion-writing because courts,
like athletic competitions, apply
an adversary model that produces
winners and losers in contests
monitored by neutral decision-makers
who apply established rules and
procedures. Judges frequently invoke
sports to illuminate core values
inherent in the adversary system on
the playing field or in the court room,
such as the “level playing field,” an
ideal of fair play central to athletic
competition and to the quest for equal
justice under law.24
Images of the level playing
field in written judicial opinions
produce corollary images similarly
grounded in adherence to the rules
of the game. Like officials who
evenhandedly apply the rule book
to the particular circumstances of a
ballpark or other sports venue, judges
frequently remind readers that they
apply procedural and substantive
“ground rules.”25 Similar to baseball
players, litigants “may play ‘hard
ball,’ but ‘foul ball’ is . . . totally
unacceptable.”26 In civil and criminal
proceedings alike, the lawyers’
lack of civility can degenerate
unacceptably into “mud wrestling.”27
When sharp practice attempts an “end
run” around a rule or obligation,28 the
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offending party or offending lawyer
should be “thrown for a loss,”29 the
setback that sometimes happens in
football to a ball carrier who seeks
to evade tacklers by cutting a wide
path around his own end. The parties’
arguments and conduct must remain
“in bounds”30 because stepping “out
of bounds” invites sanction in court,
as it does on the playing field in many
sports.31
Courts since Flood have moved
well beyond these core values. In the
Supreme Court and the lower federal
and state courts alike, the array of
sports references that lace written
judicial opinions today is nearly as
broad as the kaleidoscope of sports
that captivate so many Americans.

SPORTS REFERENCES
IN SUPREME COURT
OPINIONS
Chief Justice Roberts’ analogy to
boxing and ice hockey in Brigham
City demonstrates the growing
comfort with sports references that
has been evident in Supreme Court
opinion-writing since the early
1970s.32 In Engquist v. Oregon
Dep’t of Agriculture in 2008,
golf helped the Court reject the
employment discrimination claim
on the ground that, as Chief Justice
Roberts wrote for the majority,
“treating seemingly similarly
situated individuals differently in
the employment context is par for
the course,” that is, the performance
expected.33 In Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Glenn a week later,
Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s majority
opinion specified that a product “falls
below par” when it fails to meet
expectations.34
In 2007, Morse v. Frederick upheld
a high school principal’s suspension
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of a student who unfurled a banner
(“BONG HiTs 4 Jesus”) at a schoolsponsored and school-supervised
event on a public street near the
campus.35 The Court found that the
principal had reasonably concluded
that the banner advocated illicit drug
use. Football accented Justice John
Paul Stevens’ dissenting argument
that the Court’s First Amendment
speech precedents also required proof
that the student’s conduct interfered
with the school’s educational mission.
“[I]nstead of demanding that the
school make such a showing,”
wrote Justice Stevens for himself
and Justices Souter and Ginsburg,
“the Court punts,” and thus avoids
confronting a difficulty, much as a
football team avoids disadvantageous
field position by kicking the ball
down field and yielding possession to
the opposition.36
In Federal Election Commission
v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
(WRL) in 2007, the Court held that,
as applied, a congressional ban on
use of corporate funds to finance
“electioneering communications”
during pre-federal election periods
violated WRL’s free speech rights.37
The decision turned on whether
WRL’s advertising constituted
campaign advocacy within the ban,
or issue advocacy outside the ban.
Chief Justice Roberts found the
question close, but concluded that
WRL was entitled to the advantage
that base runners enjoy on a close
play in baseball: “Where the First
Amendment is implicated, the tie
goes to the speaker, not the censor.”38
In Randall v. Sorrell in 2006, the
Court held that two Vermont statutory
provisions – one limiting amounts
that candidates for state office could
spend on their own campaigns,
and the other limiting campaign
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contributions by other entities –
violated the First Amendment’s free
speech guarantee.39 In the lower
courts, a central issue was whether the
state legislature sought to help insulate
incumbents from effective opposition
at the polls. Applying a basketball
term for an easy offensive score that
overpowers the opposition, dissenting
Justice Stevens cited district court
findings in an unrelated case that no
Albuquerque, New Mexico mayor had
been re-elected in the 25 years since
that city set campaign spending limits.
The uninterrupted pattern of defeat, he
wrote, “cuts against the view that there
is a slam-dunk correlation between
expenditure limits and incumbent
advantage.”40
In 1994, NLRB v. Health Care
and Retirement Corp. held that
under the National Labor Relations
Act, the company’s nurses were not
“employees” with the right to organize
and engage in collective bargaining,
but rather were “supervisors”
who directed the work of aides.41
Dissenting Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg concluded that the nurses
spent little time directing aides but,
like baseball or softball players who
bat in a teammate’s place, would
“pinch-hit for aides” when necessary
to assure proper patient care.42
In 1992, the Justices sparred
about boxing in R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, which struck down a city
hate-crime ordinance that prohibited
display of a symbol that “arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.”43 The majority
found impermissible viewpoint
discrimination because speakers
favoring tolerance in the five specified
matters would be treated differently
than their opponents. The city “has no
such authority,” wrote Justice Scalia,

“to license one side of a debate to fight
freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules”
– the basic rules of boxing published
in 1867 by John Graham Chambers
under the sponsorship of John Sholto
Douglas, the Marquis of Queensbury.44
Concurring Justice Stevens found no
viewpoint discrimination because,
“[t]o extend the Court’s pugilistic
metaphor, the St. Paul ordinance
simply bans punches ‘below the belt’ –
by either party,” that is, blows outside
the rules because they confer unfair
advantage by striking at particular
vulnerability.45
In Peretz v. United States, decided
in 1991, the Court held that the
Federal Magistrates Act authorizes
the district court to permit magistrate
judges to conduct voir dire in felony
cases with the litigants’ consent.46 The
majority distinguished a prior decision
of the Court, which had withheld
this authority where the parties had
not consented.47 Writing for himself
and Justices White and Blackmun,
dissenting Justice Thurgood Marshall
argued that the prior decision
depended on construction of the Act
and not on absence of consent, and he
accused the majority of “an amazing
display of interpretive gymnastics”
to peg the outcome on a defendant’s
consent.48 The justices have drawn
analogies to “gymnastics,” a sport
marked by agile bodily contortions,
in more than a dozen decisions since
Peretz.49
Jones v. Thomas, decided in 1989,
arose from a Missouri prosecution
for felony-murder and attempted
robbery.50 After it became apparent
that the trial court had imposed two
consecutive sentences where state
law permitted only one, a state court
vacated the shorter sentence, which
the defendant had already served,
Precedent Spring 2010

and credited time already served
against the longer sentence. The
Court held that the procedure “fully
vindicated” the defendant’s Fifth
Amendment double jeopardy rights
because the defendant did not suffer
greater punishment than the legislature
intended.51 Justice Scalia’s dissent
likened the majority’s rationale to
excusing a batter’s failure in baseball:
“A technical rule with equitable
exceptions is no rule at all. Three
strikes is out. The state broke the rules
here, and must abide by the result.”52
In Owen v. City of Independence,
decided in 1980, the Court held
that when municipalities such as
the Missouri city are sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for violating federally
protected rights, they may not claim
qualified good faith immunity from
liability.53 To bolster his argument
that strict liability would unreasonably
subject local governments to damages
for conduct that was reasonable
when performed, dissenting Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart
and Rehnquist, evoked images of the
circuitous route characteristic of some
downhill skiing events. Strict liability,
Justice Powell wrote, “converts
municipal governance into a hazardous
slalom through constitutional
obstacles that often are unknown and
unknowable.”54
In 1978, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., football
helped explain the Court’s holding
that the Administrative Procedure
Act’s notice-and-comment formula
“established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was
willing to have the courts impose upon
agencies in conducting rulemaking
procedures.”55 Writing for the
majority, Justice William H. Rehnquist
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noted that the court of appeals had
imposed greater procedures only after
reviewing the record of the Vermont
Yankee rulemaking proceeding itself,
a vantage that he said permitted
“Monday morning quarterbacking,”
the second-guessing that happens
when a writer or fan questions athletic
strategy or decision-making from the
relative comfort of hindsight.56
In 1973, in United States v. Little
Lake Misere Land Co., the Court held
that Louisiana state legislation did not
affect later acquisitions of land made
by the United States under the federal
Migratory Bird Conservation Act.57
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger’s
majority opinion recited that the
lawsuit proceeded to conclusion in
the federal courts, but only after the
company first filed in the Louisiana
courts, and thus, like a track runner
who leaves the block before the
starting gun sounds, committed a
“false start.”58

SPORTS REFERENCES
IN LOWER COURT
OPINIONS
Little Lake Misere Land Co. began
an uninterrupted post-Flood embrace
of sports references in Supreme
Court opinions, setting an example
that has led lower federal and state
courts also to invoke references drawn
from a wide range of sports that help
shape American culture. Some of
these lower-court sports references
are ones that have also appeared in
Supreme Court decisions.59 With
their significantly larger caseloads,
however, lower courts also have
occasion to use sports references that
have not yet appeared in the United
States Reports.
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Football
A 2009 Harris Interactive survey found that professional football
remains America’s favorite sport; 31
percent of Americans who follow
one or more sports ranked professional football at the top.60 In Cabell
Huntington Hospital, Inc. v. Shalala,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit plumbed this widespread popularity when it held that the
U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services had improperly calculated
disproportionate-share payments under
the Medicare statute.61 The key section distinguished between patients
who were “eligible” for Medicaid
benefits and patients who were “entitled” to them, terms that the Secretary
contended were interchangeable. The
court of appeals rejected the contention. “In a football game,” the panel
explained, “wide receivers are eligible
to receive the ball from the quarterback, but none of them is entitled to
receive it.”62
Other lower court opinions describe
litigation strategy (like a football
coach’s strategy) as the “game plan,”63
which may be found in a “playbook.”64
Parties may engage in preliminary
“scrimmaging,” a term referring to exhibition or practice games, usually in
amateur leagues, that do not count in
league standings in football and other
sports.65 When opposing parties stake
out their respective positions, they
(like the offensive and defensive units
of opposing football teams) assume
positions at the “line of scrimmage.”66
Similar to a running back or pass
receiver when the quarterback turns
to him, a party or its representative
who takes the initiative “carries the
ball,”67 even while others “stand on the
sidelines.”68
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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Third Circuit has said that “trial judges
are somewhat like quarterbacks in that
they have a broad range of options for
their game plan.”69 Appellate courts
grant particular deference to trial
court fact-finding because “absent an
evidential vacuum or clear error, the
final judgment . . . must come from
the judicial gridiron, and not from
armchair quarterbacks’ reading of the
game in Sunday’s paper.”70 When the
trial court rules on whether to admit
assertedly cumulative evidence, the
court must decide whether the proffer would aid the jury, or whether “in
the parlance of the gridiron, [it] will
just be piling on,” akin to a late tackle
on an opposing ball carrier who has
already been brought down.71
Like a quarterback who seeks a
seemingly miraculous victory by
throwing a long desperation pass to
a teammate heavily covered near or
beyond the goal line in the waning
seconds, a party who faces impending defeat in court may throw a “Hail
Mary pass” by pressing a contention
or argument whose success appears
remote but not impossible.72 Uncertainty late in the legal proceeding may
lead to “sudden death overtime,” the
period played when teams remain
tied at the end of regulation time in
football and other sports; “death” is
“sudden” because the first team to
score and break the tie wins.73 When
the court enters final judgment in a
party’s favor, “[a] win, whether by
four touchdowns or a last second field
goal, is a win.”74
Baseball
a. The rules and conduct of the game
“The one constant through all the
years,” said James Earl Jones (“Terence Mann”) in the 1989 movie
classic, Field of Dreams, “has been
baseball. America has rolled by like an
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army of steamrollers. It’s been erased
like a blackboard, rebuilt, and erased
again. But baseball has marked the
time. This . . . game: it’s a part of our
past . . . . It reminds us of all that once
was good, and that could be again.”75
From this profound national heritage, judges “often draw on baseball
analogies.”76 In Linton v. Missouri
Veterinary Medical Board, for example, the Supreme Court of Missouri
rejected the equal protection challenge of an applicant who was denied
a license after she failed the licensing
examination three times in Missouri
and once in Illinois, though her Illinois
grade on an examination identical to
Missouri’s exceeded Missouri’s passing grade.77 The Missouri licensing
statute provided applicants only three
tries to pass.
Judge Michael A. Wolff, dissenting
in Linton, concluded that the defendant board had no rational basis for
denying the applicant a license: “There
is something inherent in the American
culture about three strikes, probably
because of our national pastime. . . .
[E]ven in baseball, a batter is allowed
more than three swings because a
foul ball, which normally counts as a
strike, does not count when it occurs
on the third strike. Thus a batter may
swing at several pitches before getting a hit, and it is no less a hit than if
it had occurred on the first or second
swing. . . . [A] pass on the fourth try
is no less a hit than a passing grade on
the first try. The analogy to baseball
is not entirely apt, because after three
strikes, the batter is only ‘out’ – not
banned for eternity.”78
By helping another person, an individual or entity “goes to bat for” the
person.79 A party that takes the initiative “steps up to the plate,” as a batter
does when he gets ready to face the
pitcher.80 A party that suffers a default

judgment without having received
constitutionally sufficient notice is
“called out on strikes without ever
being allowed a turn at bat.”81 When
a party fails to satisfy a threshold
requirement for relief, the party fails to
“get out of the batter’s box,”82 or else
to reach “first base.”83 When a court
moves toward decision after more than
one hearing, the judges “step back into
the batter’s box, having allowed one to
go by us and tipping another, in hopes
that on our third and final swing we
can avoid a judicial strike-out.”84
By advancing confusing or unexpected facts or arguments, a party or
witness throws a curve ball, similar to
the pitch designed to confuse a batter.85
Parties showing apparent restraint may
“bunt,”86 but parties seeking immediate advantage with strong claims or
defenses “swing for the fences,” like
their baseball counterparts trying to hit
a home run.87 An experienced police
officer may perceive a casual street
encounter as a drug transaction, “just
as a trained observer on the baseball
diamond might be able to point out the
bunt sign among an array of otherwise
meaningless scratches and touches by
the third base coach.”88
A party without standing suffers dismissal because “[t]o score a home run
the plaintiff must first have touched
first base.”89 To show a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits
necessary to establish entitlement to
a preliminary injunction, the movant
“need not establish that he can hit a
home run, only that he can get on base,
with a possibility of scoring later.”90
A party that enjoys overwhelming
success before settlement or final
judgment is akin to a batter who hits a
“home run”91 or a “grand slam”92 with
the bases loaded, or to a pitcher who
turns in a “perfect game”93 by retiring
all 27 batters without allowing any to
Precedent Spring 2010

reach base.
By focusing on the facts and claims,
the parties and the court keep their
“eyes on the ball,” an offensive and
defensive fundamental in baseball and
several other sports.94 A judiciallycreated rule that shortcuts the ordinary
method for calculating entitlement to
relief “essentially allows the claimant, after successfully reaching first
base, to be waved home and exempted
from traversing to second and third
bases, thus improperly converting a
single into a home run”; as base runners know, they can be called out for
leaving the base path, or for failing to
touch a base on the way to the next.95
A party that selects among reasonable alternatives executes a “fielder’s
choice,” similar to the option enjoyed
by the defensive team which, with one
or more players on base, may get an
out at any base to which an offensive
player seeks to advance.96
Like a ballplayer who misses part
of pre-season conditioning before
Opening Day, a party making a belated
argument may suffer for being “late
to spring training.”97 A party’s offer or
estimate within a particular range may
present a “ballpark figure.”98 By seeking a continuance or otherwise postponing action, a party requests a “rain
check,” similar to the substitute pass
which permits ticket holders to attend
a future makeup game when inclement weather causes postponement of
today’s game.99
A party’s relatively inconsequential
act, or its ineffective argument or action or request, may be “bush league,”
that is, worthy only of a lower minor
league game and not of major league
competition.100 An odd or unsupported
argument or request may come “out of
left field,”101 but a well-crafted argument or judicial opinion “touches all
the bases.”102 When litigants approach
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finality with the outcome in doubt,
they may enter the “late innings,” the
“ninth inning,” or may even approach
“extra innings,” which opposing baseball teams play to break a tie at the end
of the game.103
The court may call a judicial
“infield fly rule” to thwart a party’s
effort to profit from sharp tactics. (In
baseball, the infield fly rule applies
when there are less than two outs and
a force play is possible at third base or
home plate; so that the infielder cannot
intentionally drop a fly ball and get
an easy double play or triple play, the
umpire calls the batter automatically
out if the fly ball remains in fair territory and, in the umpire’s judgment,
could be caught by the infielder with
ordinary effort.)104
b. The umpire
“Baseball fits America well,” said
former Major League Baseball Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti, “because it expresses our longing for the
rule of law while licensing our resentment of law givers” – the umpires.105
“Much like an umpire in a baseball
game who does not make the rules
defining the strike zone but must only
call the balls and the strikes,” says
the Tennessee Court of Appeals, “the
jurist has the duty to apply the laws
as written.”106 “[A] judge’s job,” adds
the Wisconsin Supreme Court, “is like
an umpire’s, . . . to make calls according to the rules, not according to the
voices of a partisan crowd.”107
In Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc.,
the California Court of Appeal rejected
the defendants’ argument that the trial
judge’s misconduct did not amount to
reversible error because the misconduct affected both sides equally.108 The
panel likened the argument to “saying
a baseball team could not complain if
the umpire decided to call balls and
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strikes with his eyes closed, as long as
he kept them closed for both teams.”109
In Canady v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,110 a divided panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
the defendant store in an employment
discrimination suit that arose from a
white assistant store manager’s repeated use of racial slurs in the presence of
the black employees and co-workers.
One judge argued that the assistant
manager’s apology for one early slur
had no legal significance. “If a baseball player harassed an umpire over a
called strike, thereafter apologized, but
once again swore at the umpire, there
can be little question that the umpire
would eject the ballplayer from the
game.”111
In Huffaker v. Ramella, the Ohio
Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court decision that had shortened the
filing period provided in court rules;
the decision below meant parties had
“fallen victim to the old hidden ball
trick typically practiced by a first
baseman after an opponent has come
up with a single. . . . [But] the tag
was made by someone comparable to
the first base umpire, i.e., the judge,
instead of the first baseman.”112
Basketball
Even before President Barack
Obama “shot hoops” before television
cameras during the 2008 campaign
and then became the game’s “first
fan,” the National Basketball Association had moved “from a struggling sports league to an era-defining
cultural phenomenon.”113 Lower courts
have taken notice. Judges have likened a party’s aggressive strategy, for
example, to a “full-court press,” a basketball strategy used by the defensive
team to pressure the offensive team
up and down the court.114 A candidate
Precedent Spring 2010

who sought to disqualify a potential
opponent from the ballot on a technicality was “trying to win the championship on a technical foul rather than
taking the opposing team to the hoop
in a spirited election contest. Unfortunately, you can win on a technical
foul.”115
“A good judge in a trial is like a
good referee in a basketball game;
when he sees a foul committed, he
blows the whistle and tries to right the
wrong.”116 In Tejada v. Dubois, the
trial judge and defense counsel had
provoked each other throughout the
acrimonious trial, but the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit declined to apportion blame.117 The panel
found itself “in much the same position as a basketball referee who sees a
player throw an elbow at an adversary
but cannot tell if the blow was the initial foul or a retaliatory strike. . . . But
unlike the basketball referee, [the court
of appeals had] no need to decide
whether to assess a single foul or a
double foul” because the overall acrimony prejudiced the defendant’s effort
to present an effective defense.118
“[A] stakeholder is to a ‘stake’ he
controls as a basketball referee is to
a jump-ball. He holds it, but he does
not claim it for his own. Rather, he
willingly allows the rival contestants
to fight for it.”119 In Blackfeet National
Bank v. Nelson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected
the plaintiff bank’s claim that because
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation fully insured an unmatured
certificate of deposit (to $100,000)
up to its maturity date, the CD was a
bank deposit that the plaintiff could
sell.120 “We cannot decide the nature
of this instrument at its maturity date
any more than a referee could decide
the winner of a basketball game at
halftime.”121
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In State v. Weatherspoon, a concurring judge observed that the need to
justify race-neutral bases for peremptory strikes of potential jurors would
put “pressure on trial judges, as there
is now on basketball referees . . . to
‘roughly equalize the foul calls.’”122 As
basketball fans know, a team playing
particularly rough or dirty should accumulate more fouls than the opposition, and “evening up” the number of
foul calls for the sake of appearance or
competitive parity may be the sign of
poor refereeing.
Next issue: Sports references in the
lower federal and state courts (continued); how advocates and judges
should use sports references in written advocacy and opinions.
Much of this two-part article originally appeared in 17 Villanova Sports and
Entertainment Law Journal 1 (2010).
Reprinted by permission. Fuller notes
appear in the Law Journal article.
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